Difficulties
in the acquisition of counting skills
Richard Cowan
School of Psychology and Human Development
Institute of Education University of London
Talk (with corresponding slide numbers)
1. I
am honoured by the invitation to talk to you today about children's
counting. Many years ago on a one hot summer's day there was
a knock on my door at the Institute of Education. I opened
it to discover a gentleman in shorts, smiling. It was Professor
Vicente Bermejo. He was kind enough to present me with a copy
of his book ‘El niño y aritmética' and several
journal articles. I regret to say my grasp of Spanish has not
increased sufficiently since then. So, much of what I shall
tell you may have already been more elegantly expressed by
him.
2. The
research on young children's number development that I have
been involved with has been only possible with the collaboration
of many people, listed here, and the support of the Nuffield
Foundation.
3. I
going to begin by emphasizing why I think counting is important.
Then I shall talk about the components of counting: mastering
the number word sequence, using the count sequence to determine
numerosity, and understanding counting. I shall then review
what we think we know about why children who can count do not
count to determine relative number, and how they learn to understand
the significance of counts. Finally I shall consider some recent
work that suggests the importance of a process, subitizing,
which may be vital in supporting the development of understanding
of counting, and even more generally in understanding arithmetic.
4. Counting
is important because it is the most reliable method of determining
the exact numerosity of a set and the numerical relationship
between sets. If you know how to count you have can solve any
computational problem in arithmetic with whole numbers.
5. In
this picture there are some red dots and some blue dots. Many
people when asked for a judgment of whether there are more
red or more blue, think it looks as though there are more blue
dots. A few think there are more red dots. Some may think there
are the same number. Counting is the most convincing way to
settle differences of opinion (there are in fact 16 of each
colour).
6. Any
whole number addition, subtraction and multiplication problem
can be solved by counting, though of course this may not be
the quickest method. Counting can also be used to solve division
problems such as in this picture.
7. The
three components of counting I wish to emphasize are the number
word sequence, the procedure for using it to determine the
numerosity of sets, and understanding why counting works.
8. Mastering
the number word sequence involves learning a sequence of basic
number words, which in English and Spanish are the words for
the numbers from 0 to 19 and each of the decade words for 20,
30.. and so on up to 90, learning the multidigit words for 100,
1000, and so on, and the compound rules that tell us
how to combine these basic words and basic and multidigit words
to generate particular spoken numbers, such as for numbers
like 45 and 106
9. Websites
document the astonishing variety of number words in different
human languages. Important differences between languages exist
in the number of basic words the child has to master. There
are far fewer basic number words in Chinese (only 0 to 10).
In contrast a child learning Hindi has essentially to learn
different number words for each of the numbers from 0 to 100.
Another dimension of difference between languages is in the
length and number of syllables of individual words: all French
number words for numbers from 1 to 13 are single syllables
but none of the Italian number words are. Some number words
are quicker to say than others. Compounding rules differ
in different languages: in US English the conjunction ‘and'
is not used to link different parts of the number, so 45 is
said ‘forty-five' and 106 is said ‘one hundred six'. UK
English introduces ‘and' for numbers above 100, e.g. ‘one
hundred and six' , Spanish uses the conjunction ‘y' for numbers
between 20 and 100, e.g. ‘cuarenta y cinco' for 45.
10. It
is likely that these differences between languages affect the
ease with which children learn the number word sequence. After
all, a smaller basic number set means the child has less to
learn. One syllable number words make the child's task of telling
where one number word ends and the next begins easier (Fuson,
Richards, & Briars, 1982). Shorter words are easier to
say and to remember, which is one reason why Chinese children
can remember longer sequences of numbers than US children
(Stigler, Lee, & Stephenson, 1986). Simpler compound rules
are easier to grasp and make the decimal system more transparent,
e.g. the English equivalent of the Chinese for 45 - ‘si-shi-wu'
is ‘four-ten-five'.
11. Many
parents attempt to teach their children to count. There is
considerable variation between children in what they know in
the preschool years. Nevertheless, the range of numbers that
a child can count up to expands considerably in the first years
of schooling. Also flexibility increases - children become
capable of counting up or down from any number within their
range, and this has implications for their arithmetic. Their
grasp of the number word sequence becomes more fluent: they
can recite the number word sequence more quickly and accurately.
This means that recitation requires less conscious attention
and so allows them to devote more attention to other processes
- also important for arithmetic. Another aspect of development
is that they gain more insight into the numerical relationships
embedded in the number sequence, such as the successor relationship,
that ‘n + 1' is the number after ‘n' in the count sequence
and that ‘n -1' is the number before (Baroody, 1995), and the
composition of numbers, such as recognizing that 45 is composed
of four tens and a five.
12. As
the number sequence is verbal, children whose language development
is impaired are likely to have more difficulty mastering it.
Short term memory functioning is also likely to affect sequence
learning. As the verbal number sequence is a cultural invention
then children need to be introduced to it and supported in
developing their knowledge of it. Children who lack experience
and appropriate support either at home or at school are likely
to develop more slowly. As children are often left to figure
out some of the relationships themselves, differences in intelligence
might also be important
13. We
recently studied a group of children who seemed particularly
likely to have difficulty mastering the number word sequence.
Children with specific language impairment are those who show
impaired phonological processing and impaired understanding
of language despite average or better nonverbal intelligence.
Previous research with such children by Barbara Fazio has found
that they show poor development of count sequence knowledge.
However as they also have problems with short term memory functioning
it was not clear what the contributions of memory difficulties
and linguistic difficulties were. Much previous research on
children with number difficulties has highlighted short term
memory functioning as the crucial variable.
14. Our
study (Cowan, Donlan, Newton, & Lloyd, 2005) compared three
groups of children: an SLI group, consisting of 55 children
between 7 and 9 years old with recognized language impairment
despite average or better nonverbal intelligence, 44 of the
children were in Mainstream Schools and 11 were in Special
Schools; an Age Control (AC) group of 57 children matching
the SLI group in chronological age and nonverbal intelligence,
drawn from the same schools as the mainstream SLI children,
or from schools with similar catchment areas to the Special
Schools; and a Language Control (LC) group of 55 children,
matched with the SLI group on oral language comprehension and
with similar age-corrected nonverbal intelligence. The LC group
were much younger - between 4 and 6 years old
15. The
count sequence tasks involved no objects. In one trial, we
just asked them to recite the number sequence starting with
1. We stopped them when they reached 41. Another trial asked
them to count back from 25. We started by counting with them
25, 24, 23, and then let them continue by themselves. We also
had three counting on tasks to assess how they crossed decade,
century, and millennium boundaries. Like the counting back
task we started by counting with them and then left them to
continue.
16. We
also assessed their short term memory functioning using standardized
measures of each component in the Baddeley model (Baddeley,
2003), their understanding of grammatical contrasts using the
TROG (Bishop, 1983), their nonverbal reasoning using the Raven's
Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998).
We also asked each child's teacher to indicate the extent to
which they had covered the curriculum: we were concerned that
the children with SLI might have missed out on number work
at school because of the extra attention that had been paid
to supporting their language development.
17. In
this graph the averages are shown by spots and the variation
within groups by the vertical lines. The children with SLI
were no different whether they were in mainstream or special
schools and neither differed from the much younger LC group.
In contrast the children in the AC group were much more successful.
Variation within each group was marked.
18. As
well as resembling the LC group in their language comprehension,
the SLI groups showed similar short term memory functioning
so we attempted to determine the relative importance of these
by entering them, as well as instruction, and nonverbal reasoning
in a multiple regression. This indicated that differences in
language comprehension, nonverbal reasoning, instruction, and
central executive functioning were most important in accounting
for differences in count sequence knowledge. Incidentally,
a separate analysis of the LC group also indicated that language
comprehension and central executive functioning independently
accounted for variation in count sequence knowledge.
19. To
determine numerosity by counting requires more than just the
ability to recite the count sequence. It also requires co-ordination
with marking off items in the set to be counted so that each
item is counted once and only once and knowing how this provides
the numerosity of the set.
20. Two
claims have been made about the relation between children's
grasp of the requirements of counting and their skill in counting.
One proposal is that some understanding is in place even before
children develop much skill in counting. Gelman and Gallistel
(1978) claims that this understanding is implicit. In contrast,
Briars and Siegler (1984) suggested that understanding develops
from observation and experience of counting.
21. Testing
whether children possess implicit knowledge is challenging
because one cannot just ask children, or indeed adults, to
explain why counting works and use their explanations as a
criterion. Nor is observation satisfactory. A child counting
correctly and using counts to determine numerosity may understand
what they are doing but they may just be producing a performance
without understanding. Incorrect counts may be due to a lack
of understanding but they may also result from other causes.
Even adults miscount sometimes but we do not take this as evidence
that they do not understand what they are doing.
22. Developmental
psychologists have shown considerable ingenuity in devising
methods for assessing children's implicit knowledge of counting.
One method is error-detection. Children are asked to take on
the role of critics and comment on another's counting. If they
can spot flaws in another's counting this seems to show knowledge
of how counting should be. Another method is to use unconventional
counts that the child is unlikely to have seen. If they accept
unusual but legitimate counts while rejecting error counts
this supports the view that their understanding of counting
does not derive from their experience of being taught to count.
Asking children to predict the results of recounts in different
conditions is another method.
23. Gelman & Meck
(1983) found most 3-year-olds correctly rejected puppet miscounts
of numerosities that were larger than those they could reliably
count themselves. These miscounts included trials where the
puppet said the number words in a different order, where the
puppet omitted to count an object or counted the same object
twice, and where the puppet said something other than the last
number word reached when asked how many were in the set.
24. Subsequent
studies have usually found the same success in error detection.
Questions have been raised about what error -detection shows.
In particular does failure to detect errors prove a lack of
understanding - or might it be due to a failure to pay attention?
Does success show understanding of counting or might it result
from the child determining the numerosity of the set in another
way? There is also something strange about an adult manipulating
a puppet and pretending that the puppet is counting. Some children
may be more familiar with such pretend play than others. Might
lack of familiarity with games make some children hesitant?
25. Error-detection
on its own is inconclusive about the basis of children's success.
After all, even 3-year-olds can count to some extent so they
may have learnt about what counting requires from their instruction
in counting. Also detection of deviation from conventional
counting is not necessarily a sign of understanding. Gelman & Meck
(1983) found successful error detection combined with acceptance
of unconventional counts. Other studies have reported less
success with unconventional counts. The explanation of this
discrepancy remains uncertain.
26. Professor
Bermejo has long been studying children's understanding of
counting. He distinguishes six levels of understanding of the
relation between counting and numerosity (Bermejo, 1996). In
the first level, children do not understand questions about
numerosity. In the second level they answer with a number-word
sequence but do not refer to each item of the set. In the third
level they answer by counting the set again. In the fourth
level they repeat the last number word of the count, even when
the set has been counted backwards. In the fifth level they
show some awareness of when the last number word said is not
the numerosity but it is only in the final level that children
make accurate cardinality responses.
27. In
a recent study, Bermejo, Morales, & deOsuna (2004) conducted
an intervention with children in Level 4. They found that exposing
children to conflict between last number words from conventional
and unconventional counts resulted in substantial progress.
28. The
order-irrelevance of counting refers to the fact that as long
as each item is counted, the order in which they are counted
- left to right, right to left, or starting in the middle-
does not matter. Gelman & Gallistel (1978) found young
children were willing to count sets in different orders. Children
in Gelman and Meck's (1983) study accepted counts in unusual
orders but those in Briars & Siegler's (1984) study were
less tolerant.
29. Art
Baroody (1984) claimed acceptance of counts was insufficient
to show understanding or order-irrelevance. He argued that
the crucial test was whether children believed that counts
in different orders should yield the same numerosity. His method
of testing order-irrelevance was to ask a child to count a
set of items and then ask them to predict the result of counting
the set in a different order. He reminded them of the results
of their first count to prevent difficulties due to forgetting.
Despite this, over half his sample of 5-year-olds did not repeat
the number they had obtained from their first count. This was
despite their willingness to count the set in a different order.
30. Gelman,
Meck, & Merkin (1986) suggested that Baroody's procedure
may have inadvertently challenged children's confidence in
their first counts. Instead of being a helpful reminder, some
children may have understood it as a signal that there was
something wrong with their first count. Using a different form
of questioning led to a more positive estimate of understanding
of order-irrelevance.
31. In
our sample of preschool children we found similar effects of
type of questioning (Cowan, Dowker, Christakis, & Bailey,
1996). We also found that several children who predicted there
would be the same number if the set was counted in a different
number also predicted the same number if the set was recounted
after one item had been removed. This was particularly common
amongst children who were not so good at counting. Such a pattern
makes one doubt whether it is safe to infer understanding of
order irrelevance just on the basis of predictions of counts
in a different order. In general, children who differentiated
between subtraction and different order counts were more likely
to be accurate counters but there were some children who succeeded
despite limited counting skill.
32. Subsequent
studies have shown that detection of error counts and acceptance
of reverse order counts approaches ceiling levels by Grade
2, even in children identified as at risk for maths difficulties
(Geary, Hoard, & Hamson, 1999; Geary, Hamson, & Hoard,
2000; Geary, Hoard, Byrd-Craven, & DeSoto, 2004). However
some other kinds of unconventional order counts are not accepted
as is also shown in a large recent study of Canadian children
(LeFevre et al., in press). The explanation is unclear. It
might be that it is revealing something of their understanding
of counting. Another explanation is that it reflects the educational
environment in which a particular way of counting is stressed.
Another possibility is that it is due to the difficulty of
following some unconventional order accounts sufficiently to
judge that all the items have been counted.
33. I
turn now to consider children's counting to compare sets. Many
have observed children who can count to determine the numerosity
of single sets but do not count when asked to generate sets
of a specific numerosity (Wynn, 1990) or to compare sets. Does
this lack of counting show a lack of understanding of counting?
34. There
are several possible explanations why children might not count
to compare sets. It may be because of the information processing
demands of counting, because they do not know how to adapt
counting to meet the demands of comparison, because they lack
confidence in counting, or because they do not know the limitations
of other bases of comparison
35. The
information processing demands should not be ignored. Even
counting a single set makes considerable information processing
demands as set size increases and when the count list is less
familiar. Counting to compare sets requires counting the first
set, storing the result, counting the second set, and comparing
the results with those for the first set. This is tough without
external representation.
36. When
asked to compare sets, some children count the first set and
just continue counting to count the second set (Saxe, 1977).
Many 3- and 4-year-olds do not appreciate this is less appropriate
for comparing sets than counting each set separately (Sophian,
1988).
37. Lack
of confidence might affect likelihood of counting to compare
sets. Children learning to count will make mistakes when using
counting, whether by making single set errors or by continuing
counting. If they receive negative reinforcement without appropriate
guidance, they may be discouraged from counting.
38. Another
factor may be ignorance of the limitations of other bases for
comparison. Global perceptual bases for comparison are quick
and easy but only imperfectly correlated with number. Children
may have to discover this before they adopt the more laborious
procedure of counting. Rapid enumeration processes such as
subitizing develop prior to counting but current accounts do
not suggest that we are aware of the process of subitizing
- we are just aware of its results. Children may have to learn
to differentiate accurate subitizing, limited to small numbers,
from estimation that is more approximate.
39. There
is much work that has examined young children's number development
by using conflict displays (e.g. Brainerd, 1973; Bryant, 1972;
Cowan, 1984, 1987a). These are displays which present a conflict
between the relative number judgment suggested by global features
and the correct judgment that can be discovered by counting
or perceptual correspondence. There are three main types of
conflict displays: Lengths Equal, Numbers Unequal (LENU); Lengths
Unequal, Numbers Equal (LUNE); and Lengths Unequal, Shorter
Row More (LUSR)
40. Here
is a LENU display. Children frequently claim there are the
same numbers of blue and red dots. In fact there are not
41. Here
is a LUNE display. Few children will judge there to be the
same numbers of blue and red dots unless they count them or
see guidelines linking each blue dot with one and only one
red dot.
42. Here
is a LUSR display. Many children will judge there to be more
in the longer row.
43. Even
small number versions - with only 3 or 4 dots in each row -
are often misjudged by 3-year-olds (Michie, 1984). Rarely do
children spontaneously count to compare.
44. Michie
(1984) tried several interventions to encourage children to
count the items to find out whether each row had the same number.
Emphasizing the importance of being right was not effective. Providing
feedback about the correctness of judgments based on separate
counts did make children more likely to count in her study,
and we found this too (Cowan, Foster, & Al-Zubaidi, 1993).
We also found that showing children the consistency of counting
based judgments with perceptual correspondence worked. Perceptual
correspondence was shown by pairing each item in one row with
an item in the other row. When the sets were unequal the unpaired
item was at the end of the row. However, although preschoolers
would count to compare, they still did not judge consistently
with their counting. In this they differed from older children.
Both groups were selected for not spontaneously counting. Both
showed much increased counting after the intervention. The
older children subsequently judged consistently with their
counting.
45. To
investigate when children trust count information to judge
conflict displays I (Cowan, 1987b) studied three age groups:
preschoolers, 5 year olds - in their first year at school,
and 6 year olds. In each age group accurate counters were selected. I
used both small number versions of the displays and large number
versions. To see whether confidence in counting was relevant
the counting was done either by the children or by me (I told
them I was very good at counting). It made no difference. Few
preschoolers were reliably correct on all the displays. In
contrast almost all 5 -year-olds judged every small number
display correctly and the 6-year-olds judged every large number
display correctly too. Overall the LUNE displays were judged
better than the LUSR displays.
46. The
explanation of the difference between small and large number
displays is likely to be the availability of other methods
for comparing apart from counting. These include subitizing
and perceptual matching. Whereas these can help children judge
the small number displays they are not available for larger
number displays. The difference between LUNE and LUSR displays
is likely to be due to insecure knowledge of relative magnitude.
When counts of the two sets yield the same numbers, no knowledge
of magnitude is required to make the correct judgment. In contrast
when the counts yield different numbers, one needs insight
into the count list to determine the more numerous set, especially
when the display suggests the opposite judgment.
47. Subitizing
in adults is a rapid and accurate process of enumerating small
numerosities (up to 7). It is not just overlearnt counting. Starkey & Cooper
(1995) showed in young children its range is more limited than
adults' but appears prior to verbal counting. They also compared
different configurations - rows or two dimensional patterns
and found children could subitize them. So it is not just pattern
recognition. They suggest it may underlie babies' discrimination
between small numerosities.
48. Some
believe subitizing is the basis for mapping counting and number
words onto representations of numerosity and that subitizing
underlies learning what affects numerosity (Klahr & Wallace,
1973). If so, people with defective subitizing at risk for
difficulties with number.
49. Charles,
a psychology graduate, had always had problems with mathematics.
Butterworth (1999) describes him as lacking the ability to
subitize – he had to count even arrays of two dots. Butterworth
attributes Charles's difficulties to a defective number module
in the brain.
50. Another
function of this module is magnitude comparison. Most adults
know the relative magnitude of numbers between 1 and 9. The
speed with which they judge relative magnitude is related to
numerical distance. They are faster judging that 9 is more
than 5 than that 6 is more than 5. The idea is that in development
symbols for numbers become connected with a representation
of number, a kind of mental number line. Charles is much
slower and shows the opposite pattern, also attributed to neural
abnormality.
51. Butterworth's
(2003) Dyscalculia Screener assesses the two measures – enumeration
of small numbers and magnitude comparison – that he believes
are subserved by the number module. He does not claim that
all children with number difficulties have defective number
modules. But children whose number modules, and so subitizing,
are compromised should have difficulties understanding counting.
As yet there is no method for testing this interesting idea
in very young children.
52. In
conclusion, verbal counting is a powerful cultural tool that
incorporates many important ideas about number. Children can
take a long time to discover them. Successful brief interventions
suggest that this is not inevitable. Nonverbal numerosity processes
may contribute to learning about counting and number but how
remains disputed (Carey, 2004; Gallistel & Gelman, 2005;
Rips, Asmuth, & Bloomfield, in press). There is still much
to learn about children's counting.
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